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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Clayton Bradshaw appeals from his conviction for felony destruction of 
evidence following a jury trial. On appeal, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the jury's verdict for felony destruction of evidence. In so arguing, he asserts 
that the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607 (2003), in 
which it interpreted the felony destruction of evidence statute, Idaho Code § 18-2603, 
was wrongly decided because it relied on public policy considerations and legislative 
history, rather than the rule of lenity, in expanding the scope of an ambiguous criminal 
statute. When the statute is properly interpreted, the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to establish Mr. Bradshaw's guilt on the charge of felony destruction of 
evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
James Clayton Bradshaw was charged by Amended Information with, inter alia, 
felony destruction of evidence, 1 alleged to have been committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, JAMES CLAYTON BRADSHAW, on or about the 
28th day of October, 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did 
willfully destroy and/or conceal a baggie of white powdery substance 
knowing that the baggie of white powdery substance was about to be 
produced, used or discovered as evidence in a felony investigation 
authorized by law and with the intent to prevent it from being so produced, 
used or discovered. 
(R., p.56.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial. 
1 Mr. Bradshaw was also charged with resisting or obstructing officers, driving without 
privileges, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.40-41, 55-56.) Neither the 
misdemeanor charges nor the enhancement are relevant to this appeal. 
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The first witness called was Isaiah Wear, a police officer with the Meridian Police 
Department, who works as "a narcotics canine handler." (Tr., p.199, L.23 - p.201, L.4.) 
His drug dog, Blitz, "is trained to alert to the odor of marijuana, methamphetamine, 
cocaine, and heroin." (Tr., p.202, Ls.13-14.) Officer Wear approached Mr. Bradshaw, 
whom he knew to have a suspended driver's license, after observing him driving a 
vehicle. (Tr., p.206, L.7 - p.20B, L.2.) Mr. Bradshaw was already out of the car at the 
time of the contact, and Officer Wear informed him that he was being arrested for 
driving without privileges. (Tr., p.20B, L.13 - p.209, L.7.) Officer Wear ordered 
Mr. Bradshaw "to set the items he had in his left hand down on - on the vehicle, set 
them down." Mr. Bradshaw eventually complied, placing paperwork and a cell phone on 
the trunk of his car. (Tr., p.209, L.14 - p.210, L.2S.) Mr. Bradshaw maintained "that he 
was being harassed" and "demand[ed] a supervisor [be called] to the scene." 
(Tr., p.210, Ls.24-25.) Officer Wear, assisted by Sergeant Harper, who had arrived as 
back-up, eventually handcuffed Mr. Bradshaw. (Tr., p.211, Ls.6-1B.) 
After handcuffing Mr. Bradshaw, Officer Wear and Sergeant Harper lifted him to 
his feet, at which point Officer Wear began a search of Mr. Bradshaw's person, 
removing the contents of his pockets and placing them on the trunk of his car, near the 
papers and cell phone. Officer Wear didn't pay particular attention to the items as he 
removed them from Mr. Bradshaw's pockets, as he planned to examine them later. 
(Tr., p.212, L.12 - p.215, L.6.) 
After emptying Mr. Bradshaw's pockets, Officer Wear and Sergeant Harper 
"began to lead him toward that [police] car," at which point Mr. Bradshaw "Iunge[d] 
toward the Cadillac." Officer Wear "wasn't sure what he was doing" and "thought he 
was trying to harm himself" by "headbutting the trunk." (Tr., p.215, Ls.7-22.) Officer 
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Wear then heard Sergeant Harper "yell out, spit it out" and saw him "grab Mr. Bradshaw 
by the face and bring him back up." At that point, Officer Wear "could see a bindle, a 
clear, plastic wrapped item with a white, powdery substance in it, and it was resting at 
the tip of his lips. And he, then, tilted his head back and ingested the item."2 
(Tr., p.216, Ls.4-20.) The bindle was approximately "a half inch by half inch or so." 
Officer Wear described it as being consistent with bindles that are commonly used "to 
package cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin." (Tr., p.219, L.25 - p.221, L.3.) 
Describing his thoughts upon seeing the bindle in Mr. Bradshaw's mouth, Officer Wear 
testified, "My - my number one concern was, if he ingests this material ... my concern 
was he could die from it if it bursts open in his stomach.,,3 (Tr., p.222, Ls.14-17.) 
After placing Mr. Bradshaw in a patrol car, Officer Wear deployed Blitz, "[t]o try to 
determine what the substance was .... " (Tr., p.224, Ls.1-14.) Officer Wear described 
Blitz as "a trained, certified, drug detecting canine." (Tr., p.225, Ls.19-23.) Blitz is a 
"dual purpose dog" because he is used for both drug detection and apprehending 
suspects. (Tr., p.226, Ls.9-16.) The dog receives regular training, and every fifteen 
months, he must pass an Idaho State Police administered certification program that 
requires one hundred percent accuracy. (Tr., p.227, L.3 - p.230, L.2.) Blitz is a 
"passive alert dog," meaning that when he alerts on an odor of one of the four drugs for 
which he is certified "he sits next to it." (Tr., p.230, L.22 - p.231, L.8.) When asked 
whether his sitting could be confused with "a regular sit," Officer Wear described his 
ability to "read" his particular dog "and recognize some of the pre-alerts." Specifically, 
When he gets that odor as he walks by, his head will snap back, his mouth 
will generally close, unless - unless he's tired or it's hot out, his mouth will 
2 Neither the bindle nor its contents was ever recovered. (Tr., p.223, Ls.5-18.) 
3 The officer who transported Mr. Bradshaw to jail testified that he declined treatment at 
the hospital and exhibited no medical problems. (Tr., p.252, L.8 - p.256, L.24.) 
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close and he'll focus. His ears will be - my dog - I'm describing my dog 
specifically his ears will be forward, a lot of times his tail's wagging, and 
his head moves rapidly toward that source. And, I mean, he shuffles back 
and forth, his muscle tone will quiver with excitement. 
When he sits next to that odor, the way I know he has alerted is he will sit 
rapidly, sit quick, his head will be low, his ears are forward, his eyes will be 
wide, they won't blink. He's very intense, he'll have an arch in his back, 
and he looks like he's getting ready to pounce [on] something. And that 
will be his reward for finding the narcotics, the odor of narcotics, and he's 
wanting his ball to be rewarded. 
Those are the behaviors I look for to confirm that he has alerted on a 
narcotic odor. 
(Tr., p.231, L.9 - p.232, L.19 (emphasis added).) 
According to Officer Wear, "the canine doesn't necessarily alert on the drug itself, 
he alerts on the odor." Even when no narcotics are present in a location, the dog will 
still alert if the odor from narcotics that were present earlier has been absorbed by some 
item that was once near the narcotics. Such items include paper and cotton balls. 
"[O]ftentimes, when we get a vehicle where my - my dog has alerted, whether it's on a 
glove box, a center console, Whatever, the odor can still be present even though a 
narcotic is not." (Tr., p.232, L.20 - p.233, L.20.) 
Upon deploying Blitz, Officer Wear "worked in a clockwise rotation, working from 
the front of the vehicle, around the doors, around the trunks, and back up the driver's 
side." When Blitz got to the trunk, where the paperwork and objects from 
Mr. Bradshaw's pockets were located, he "displayed a positive alert to the odor of an 
illegal narcotic." (Tr., p.235, LsA-24.) Blitz is not able to indicate which of the four 
types of drugs he has been trained on was the source of the odor. (Tr., p.236, Ls.7-16.) 
Considering Blitz's alert that the odor of one of the four controlled substances for which 
he was trained was present, Officer Wear "believed it was either methamphetamine or 
cocaine" because, based on its appearance, it could not have been marijuana or heroin. 
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(Tr., p.236, L.17 - p.239, L.12.) On cross-examination, Officer Wear acknowledged that 
sometimes drug dealers sell fake controlled substances to users. (Tr., p.240, Ls.11 
The State then called Shawn Harper, a patrol sergeant with the Meridian Police 
Department. (Tr., p.276, Ls.11-20.) He testified that possession of either 
methamphetamine or cocaine is a felony in Idaho. (Tr., p.284, Ls.2-4.) Sergeant 
Harper's testimony was consistent with Officer Wear's, with the exception of the fact 
that he believed the substance in the bindle to be methamphetamine, rather than 
cocaine, because of its granular appearance. (Tr., p.284, L.9 - p.311, L.25.) 
Following a jury question concerning the definition of reasonable doubt 
(Tr., p.397, Ls.10-14), the jury found Mr. Bradshaw guilty of all three charges. 
(Tr., pA01, L.16 - pA02, L.i5.) Following a court trial on the enhancement, 
Mr. Bradshaw was found to be a persistent violator (Tr., pA22, Ls.15-i7), and received 
a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, on the felony destruction of 
evidence conviction, with the district court retaining jurisdiction "for evaluative 
purposes." (Tr., pA46, L.20 - pA47, LA.) Mr. Bradshaw filed a Notice of Appeal timely 
from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.i 06.) 
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ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Bradshaw's conviction for felony destruction 
of evidence when the statute is interpreted using the rule of lenity? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Bradshaw's Conviction For Felony 
Destruction Of Evidence When The Statute Is Interpreted Using The Rule Of Lenity 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Bradshaw asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence when the ambiguous language 
of the statute is interpreted using the rule of lenity. He urges a reversal of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607 (Ct. App. 2003), because, in 
Peteja, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the rule of lenity adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, instead incorrectly resorting to consideration of public policy and 
legislative history to broaden the scope of the ambiguous language in the criminal 
statute. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Statutory Interpretation 
Interpreting the meaning of a statute is a question of law over which an Idaho 
appellate court exercises free review. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 
204 (2002) (citation omitted). 
2. Sufficiency Of The Evidence 
The standard of review for an appellate court regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction was set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. 
Peite, 122 Idaho 809 (Ct. App. 1992), in which it noted, 
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon 
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts, 
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and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the 
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to 
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. 
Peite, 122 Idaho at 823 (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be 
of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. 
Johnson, 131 Idaho 808,809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Batt v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 
Idaho 580, 586 (1996)). 
A verdict cannot be the result of speculation or conjecture. See Ryan v. Beisner, 
123 Idaho 42,46 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture.") 
(citing Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 652 (1968)); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 344 (1933) (Jury's verdict cannot rest "upon mere 
speculation and conjecture"); United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 7 (2 Cir. 1996) ("[A] 
conviction cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture."); United States V. Pettigrew, 
77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] verdict may not rest on mere suspicion, 
speculation, or conjecture .... "); United States V. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1995) 
("We cannot permit speculation to substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even though rational jurors may believe in the likelihood of the defendant's guilt, as they 
probably did in this case, they may not convict on that belief alone."); United States V. 
Diggs, 527 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[A] jury is not justified in convicting a 
defendant on the basis of mere suspicion, speculation or conjecture."); United States V. 
Bethea, 442 F.2d 790, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[T]he trial judge should not allow the case 
to go to the jury if the evidence is such as to permit the jury to merely conjecture or 
speculate as to defendant's guilt."); Karchmer V. United States, 61 F.2d 623 (yth Cir. 
1932) ("A verdict which finds its only support in conjecture and speculation cannot 
stand."). 
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C. The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Bradshaw's Conviction For 
Felony Destruction Of Evidence When The Statute Is Interpreted Using The Rule 
Of Lenity 
Idaho Code § 18-2603, in relevant part, provides: 
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in 
writing, or other object, matter or thing, is about to be produced, used or 
discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or 
investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully [sic] destroys, alters or 
conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, 
used or discovered, is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the trial, 
proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature and involves a 
felony offense, in which case said person is guilty of a felony . ... 
I.C. § 18-2603 (emphasis added). 
The language elevating the offense to a felony when the investigation is "criminal 
in nature and involves a felony offense" was added to the statute in 1983. Peteja, 139 
Idaho at 611. After examining the legislative history and public policy considerations 
behind the amendment, the Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded, "[W]e give proper 
effect to the legislature's intent by interpreting the statute to mean that whether the 
investigation 'involves a felony offense' depends on whether the evidence that was 
destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to demonstrate the commission of 
a felony." Id. at 612. Nowhere in Peteja did the Court of Appeals address the rule of 
lenity. Mr. Bradshaw maintains that the Idaho Court of Appeals engaged in incorrect 
statutory interpretation when it considered public policy and legislative history in 
adopting an expansive reading of the criminal statute, rather than utilizing the rule of 
lenity. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "It is [a] well settled principal [sic] of 
law that criminal statutes must be strictly construed." State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 
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430, 436 (1980) (citations omitted). It has described this principle, sometimes referred 
to as the rule of lenity,4 as follows: 
A statute defining a crime must be sufficiently explicit so that all persons 
subject thereto may know what conduct on their part will subject them to 
its penalties. A criminal statute must give a clear and unmistakable 
warning as to the acts which will subject one to criminal punishment, and 
courts are without power to supply what the legislature has left vague. An 
act cannot be held as criminal under a statute unless it clearly appears 
from the language used that the legislature so intended. 
State v. Hahn, 92 Idaho 265, 267 (1968) (citations omitted). 
Interpreting a statute concerning victim impact statements, the Idaho Supreme 
Court described an appellate court's role in statutory construction as follows: "[T]his 
Court will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give 
effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every 
word therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions." State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 575 (2008) (emphasis added) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 
425, 428 (1993)). In rejecting a public policy argument advanced by the State when 
interpreting the statute providing for time limitations for prosecuting felonies, the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained, "[S]uch policy arguments should be made to the legislature 
which has the power to change the statute, and not to this Court." State v. Barnes, 124 
4 The rule of lenity adopted by the United States Supreme Court for use in interpreting 
federal criminal statutes appears to be less protective of individuals and less concerned 
with government overreach than the rule adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. See 
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) ("The rule of lenity applies only if, 
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a 
guess as to what Congress intended.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and 
ellipsis omitted). Any difference between the federal and Idaho rules of lenity is not 
surprising in light of the First Circuit's conclusion that "[f]ederal courts have no power to 
... mandate adoption of the rule of lenity." Butler v. O'Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 519 (1st 
Cir. 2011). The United States Supreme Court's version of the rule of lenity is, therefore, 
not binding on Idaho courts. 
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Idaho 379, 380-81 (1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 
424 (2002). 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated on a number of occasions that the 
only method by which the legislature's intent in enacting an ambiguous criminal statute 
may be divined is through an examination of the statutory language, with any 
ambiguities resolved in favor of the defendant. Resort to legislative history and public 
policy considerations in order to broaden the scope of an ambiguous criminal statute is, 
therefore, inappropriate under Idaho Supreme Court precedent. 
Over the years, this Court's clear holding as to the appropriate method by which 
to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes has been weakened by Idaho Court of Appeals 
decisions in which legislative intent is determined by resorting to the consideration of 
legislative history and / or public policy. 5 See State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 154 
(Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that, in determining legislative intent, "we look to ... the 
public policy behind the statute") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); State v. Escobar, 
134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 2000) ("If the [statutory] language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be applied according to its plain terms, and there is no need for 
the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation.") (citations 
omitted). 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court, in a number of appeals involving the 
interpretation of criminal statutes has mentioned, in dicta, that public policy 
5 In doing so, the Court of Appeals may have been conflating the statutory interpretation 
of non-criminal statutes engaged in by the Idaho Supreme Court with that for criminal 
statutes. See State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475 (2007) (interpreting Idaho's open 
meetings law, a non-criminal statute, and explaining that "[t]o ascertain legislative intent, 
the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of 
the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history") 
(citing Carrier v. Lake Pend Orei/le Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807 (2006». 
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considerations and legislative history are appropriate means of ascertaining legislative 
intent. See State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999)6; State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 
654, 659 (1999); State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003); State v. Jeppesen, 138 
Idaho 71,74 (2002); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690 (2004); State v. Urrabazo, 150 
Idaho 158, 161 (2010); State v. Doe, 47 Idaho 326, 328 (2009). The dicta, in all but 
three of the cases,? involved citation to cases interpreting non-criminal statutes. Rhode, 
133 Idaho at 462 (citing Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29 (1963)); Burnight, 132 
Idaho at 659 (citing Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410,416 
(1993)); Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362 (citing Lopez v. State, Indus. Speciallndem. Fund, 
136 Idaho 174 (200'1); Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602 (1999)); Doe, 147 Idaho 
at 328 (citing Hayden Lake Fire Protection oist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 398-99 
(2005)). The situation appears to mirror one concerning another issue of statutory 
construction that existed in dicta in a number of Idaho Supreme Court cases until it was 
recently clarified when the Court disavowed the dicta. See Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg. Med. Gtr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011) (disavowing dicta in dozens of Idaho Supreme 
Court opinions spanning twenty years implying that it may be appropriate to alter the 
plain language of an unambiguous statute by considering whether giving effect to the 
statute as written would lead to palpably absurd results). 
One case in which the Court of Appeals has resorted to an examination of 
legislative history and public policy considerations without even considering the rule of 
6 Interestingly, in Rhode, two sentences before the dicta concerning consideration of 
public policy and legislative history, the Court cited Thompson, and explained that, 
when resolving ambiguities involving "elements or potential sanctions of a crime, this 
Court will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant." Rhode, 133 
Idaho at 462 (citing Thompson, 101 Idaho at 437). 
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lenity in interpreting an ambiguous criminal statute concerns the destruction of evidence 
statute. In that case, Peteja, the defendant argued that the offense of destruction of 
evidence should be elevated to a felony only when the investigation at issue began as a 
felony investigation, thereby rendering the "misdemeanor or felony nature of an 
investigation ... fixed at the time that the officer begins the investigation." Peteja, 139 
Idaho at 611. In rejecting Peteja's proffered interpretation of the ambiguity, the Court of 
Appeals considered the legislative history and the "public policy underlying statutes 
criminalizing the destruction of evidence." Id. at 611-12. Ultimately, the Court of 
Appeals explained, "[W]e give proper effect to the legislature's intent by interpreting the 
statute to mean that whether the investigation 'involves a felony offense' depends on 
whether the evidence that was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to 
demonstrate the commission of a felony." Id. at 612. Consideration of lenity is 
completely absent from the Peteja decision. 
Mr. Bradshaw asserts that Peteja was incorrectly decided insofar as the Court of 
Appeals failed to consider the rule of lenity adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court and 
improperly resorted to consideration of public policy concerns and legislative history in 
interpreting the criminal statute's ambiguous language. As such, he respectfully 
requests that this Court apply the rule of lenity, and conclude that the behavior 
prohibited by the statute is only elevated to a felony if it occurs while a felony 
investigation is being conducted.s To hold otherwise would violate the rule of lenity and 
this Court's longstanding jurisprudence. 
7 Those three cases are Jeppesen, Yager, and Urrabazo. Jeppesen cited Rhode, 
Yager cited Bumight, and Urrabazo cited Doe. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho at 74; Yager, 139 
Idaho at 690; Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 161. 
8 If this case is assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, per Idaho Appellate Rule 
108(b), he maintains that, to the extent that the Court of Appeals feels bound by Pefeja, 
13 
Under a proper interpretation of the statute, the facts presented at trial were not 
sufficient to support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence because the 
investigation being conducted concerned a misdemeanor charge of driving without 
privileges. If this Court accepts his invitation to overrule Peteja and interprets the 
statute using the rule of lenity, he asserts that the appropriate remedy is to vacate the 
judgment of conviction for felony destruction of evidence, and remand this matter for 
resentencing on a charge of misdemeanor destruction of evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bradshaw respectfully requests that this 
Court overrule Peteja, apply the rule of lenity to interpret Idaho Code § 18-2603, find 
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for felony 
destruction of evidence, and remand this matter to the district court for sentencing on a 
misdemeanor charge of destruction of evidence. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2013. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
he submits that its decision was "manifestly wrong" and that adopting the interpretation 
advanced by Mr. Bradshaw is "necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law 
and remedy continued injustice." State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 322-23 (1990) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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